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Abstract
Let C be a class of finite and infinite graphs that is closed under induced subgraphs. The well-
known Łos´-Tarski Theorem from classical model theory implies that C is definable in first-order
logic (FO) by a sentence ϕ if and only if C has a finite set of forbidden induced finite subgraphs.
It provides a powerful tool to show nontrivial characterizations of graphs of small vertex cover, of
bounded tree-depth, of bounded shrub-depth, etc. in terms of forbidden induced finite subgraphs.
Furthermore, by the Completeness Theorem, we can compute fromϕ the corresponding forbidden
induced subgraphs. We show that this machinery fails on finite graphs.
– There is a class C of finite graphs which is definable in FO and closed under induced
subgraphs but has no finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs.
– Even if we only consider classes C of finite graphs which can be characterized by a finite
set of forbidden induced subgraphs, such a characterization cannot be computed from an
FO-sentence ϕ, which defines C , and the size of the characterization cannot be bounded by
f(|ϕ|) for any computable function f .
Besides their importance in graph theory, the above results also significantly strengthen similar
known results for arbitrary structures.
1. Introduction
Many classes of graphs can be defined by a finite set of forbidden induced finite subgraphs. One
of the simplest examples is the class of graphs of bounded degree. Let d ≥ 1 and Fd consist of
all graphs with vertex set {1, . . . , d + 2} and maximum degree exactly d + 1. Then a graph G has
degree at most d if and only if no graph in Fd is isomorphic to an induced subgraph ofG. Less trivial
examples include graphs of small vertex cover (attributed to Lova´sz [9]), of bounded tree-depth [5],
and of bounded shrub-depth [13]. As a matter of fact, understanding forbidden induced subgraphs
for those graph classes is an important question in structural graph theory [7, 21, 12, 11]. However,
a straightforward adaptation of a result in [10] shows that it is in general impossible to compute the
forbidden induced subgraphs from a description of classes of graphs by Turing machines.
It is folklore [1, 17] that characterization by finitely many forbidden induced finite subgraphs is
equivalent to definability by a universal sentence of first-order logic (FO). But only very recently, it
was realized [2] that such a characterization can be further understood by the Łos´-Tarski theorem.
Łos´ [15] and Tarski [19] proved the first so-called preservation theorem of classical model theory.
In its simplest form it says that the class GRAPH(ϕ) of finite and infinite graphs that are models of a
sentence ϕ of first-order logic is closed under induced subgraphs (or, that ϕ is preserved under induced
subgraphs) if and only if there is a universal FO-sentence µ with GRAPH(ϕ) = GRAPH(µ). Recall
that a universal sentence µ is a sentence of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0, where µ0 is quantifier-free.
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Such a universal sentence µ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 expresses that certain patterns of induced subgraphs
with at most k vertices are forbidden. In fact, let F be a finite set of finite graphs and denote by
FORB(F ) the class of (finite and infinite) graphs that do not contain an induced subgraph isomorphic
to a graph in F . Then for a universal sentence µ as above we have
GRAPH(µ) = FORB
(
Fk(µ)
)
. (1)
Here for any FO-sentence ϕ and k ≥ 1 by Fk(ϕ) we denote the class of graphs that are models of ¬ϕ
and whose universe is {1, . . . , ℓ} for some ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. Clearly, Fk(ϕ) is finite.
We say that a class C of finite and infinite graphs is definable by a finite set of forbidden induced
subgraphs if there is a finite set F of finite graphs such that C = FORB(F ). Hence the graph-
theoretic version of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem can be restated in the form:
(I) Let C be a class of finite and infinite graphs. The following are equivalent:
(i) C is closed under induced subgraphs and FO-axiomatizable.
(ii) C is axiomatizable by a universal sentence.
(iii) C is definable by a finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs.
This version of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem is already contained, at least implicitly, in the article [20] of
Vaught published in 1954. In addition, it is easy to see that the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) holds
for any class of finite graphs too.
Note that we have repeatedly mentioned that in the Łos´-Tarski Theorem graphs are allowed to be
infinite. This is not merely a technicality. In [2], to obtain the forbidden induced subgraph charac-
terization of graphs of bounded shrub-depth using the Łos´-Tarski Theorem, one simple but vital step
is to extend the notion of shrub-depth to infinite graphs. Indeed, Tait [18] exhibited a class C of fi-
nite structures (which might be understood as colored directed graphs) which is closed under induced
substructures and FO-axiomatizable. Yet, C is not definable by any universal sentence, thus cannot
be characterized by a finite set of forbidden induced substructures. As the first result of this paper, we
strengthen Tait’s result to graphs.
Theorem 1.1. There is a class C of finite graphs with the following properties.
(i) C is closed under induced subgraphs and FO-axiomatizable,
(ii) C is not definable by a finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs.
Even though we are interested in structural and algorithmic results for classes of finite graphs, we see
that in order to apply the Łos´-Tarski Theorem for such purposes we have to consider classes of finite
and infinite graphs. So in this paper “graph” means finite or infinite graph. As in the preceding result
we mention it explicitly if we only consider finite graphs.
Complementing Theorem 1.1 we show that it is even undecidable whether a given FO-definable
class of finite graphs which is closed under induced subgraphs can be characterized by a finite set of
forbidden induced subgraphs. More precisely:
Theorem 1.2. There is no algorithm that for any FO-sentence ϕ such that
GRAPHfin(ϕ) :=
{
G
∣∣ G is a finite graph and a model of ϕ}
is closed under induced subgraphs decides whether ϕ is equivalent to a universal sentence on finite
graphs.
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As mentioned at the beginning, for a class of finite graphs definable by a finite set of forbidden
induced subgraphs, it is preferable to have an explicit construction of those graphs. This however turns
out to be difficult for many natural classes of graphs. For example, the forbidden induced subgraphs
are only known for tree-depth at most 3 [7]. Let us consider the k-vertex cover problem for a constant
k ≥ 1. It asks whether a given graph has a vertex cover (i.e., a set of vertices that contains at least one
endpoint of every edge) of size at most k. The class of all YES-instances of this problem, finite and
infinite, is closed under induced subgraphs and FO-axiomatizable by the FO-sentence
ϕkVC := ϕGRAPH ∧ ∃x1 . . . ∃xk∀y∀z
(
Eyz →
∨
1≤ℓ≤k
(xℓ = y ∨ xℓ = z)
)
,
where ϕGRAPH axiomatizes the class of graphs. Hence, by (I) the class of YES-instances can be defined
by a finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs. As the reader will notice it is by no means trivial to
find a universal sentence equivalent to ϕkVC. But on the other hand, by the Completeness Theorem,
we can search for such a universal sentence by enumerating all possible universal sentences µ and
all possible proofs for ⊢ ϕkVC ↔ µ, and then extract the corresponding forbidden induced subgraphs
from µ as in (1).
To explain the hardness of constructing forbidden induced subgraphs, we prove two negative
results.
Theorem 1.3. There is no algorithm that for any FO-sentence ϕ which is equivalent to a universal
sentence µ on finite graphs computes such a µ.
Or equivalently, there is no algorithm that for any FO-sentence ϕ such that
GRAPHfin(ϕ) = FORBfin(F )
for a finite set F of graphs computes such an F . Here,
FORBfin(F ) :=
{
G
∣∣ G is a finite graph without induced subgraph isomorphic to a graph in F}.
Theorem 1.4. Let f : N→ N be a computable function. Then there is a class C of finite graphs and
an FO-sentence ϕ such that
(i) C = GRAPHfin(ϕ).
(ii) C = GRAPHfin(µ) for some universal sentence µ, in particular C is closed under induced
subgraphs.
(iii) For every universal sentence µ with C = GRAPHfin(µ) we have |µ| ≥ f(|ϕ|).
Theorem 1.3 significantly strengthens the aforementioned result of [10]. Even if a class C of
finite graphs definable by a finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs is given by an FO-sentence ϕ
with C = GRAPHfin(ϕ), instead of a much more powerful Turing machine, we still cannot compute
an appropriate finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs for C from ϕ. On top of it, Theorem 1.4
implies that the size of forbidden subgraphs for C cannot be bounded by any computable function in
terms of the size of ϕ.
There is an important precursor for Theorem 1.4,
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Theorem 1.5 (Gurevich’s Theorem [14]). Let f : N → N be computable. Then there is an FO-
sentence ϕ such that the class MOD(ϕ) of models of ϕ is closed under induced substructures but for
every universal sentence µ with MODfin(µ) = MODfin(ϕ) we have |µ| ≥ f(|ϕ|).
Hence, Theorem 1.4 can be viewed as the graph-theoretic version of Theorem 1.5.
Besides its importance in graph theory, Theorem 1.4 is also relevant in the context of algorithmic
model theory. For algorithmic applications, the Łos´-Tarski theorem provides a normal form (i.e., a
universal sentence) for any FO-sentence preserved under induced substructures. In [3], it is shown
that on labelled trees there is no elementary bound on the length of the equivalent universal sentence
in terms of the original one. We should point out that Theorem 1.4 is not comparable to Theorem 6.1
in [3], since our lower bound is uncomputable (and thus, much higher than non-elementary) while the
classes of graphs we construct in the proof are dense (thus very far from trees).
Our technical contributions. For every vocabulary it is well known that the class of structures
of this vocabulary is FO-interpretable in graphs (see for example [8]). So one might expect that
Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.4 can be derived easily from Tait’s Theorem and Gurevich’s Theorem
using the standard FO-interpretations. However, an easy analysis shows that those interpretations
result in classes of graphs that are not closed under induced subgraphs. So we introduce the notion
of strongly existential interpretation which translates any class of structures preserved under induced
substructures to a class of graphs closed under induced subgraphs. A lot of care is needed to construct
strongly existential interpretations.
Related research. Let us briefly mention some further results related to the Łos´-Tarski Theorem.
Essentially one could divide them into three categories: (a) The positive results showing that for
certain classes C of finite structures the analogue of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem holds if we restrict to
structures in C . For example, this is the case if C is the class of all finite structures of tree-width
k or less for some k ∈ N [1] or if C is the class of all finite structures whose hypergraph satisfies
certain properties [6]. (b) Both just mentioned papers contain also negative results, i.e, classes for
which the analogue of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem fails: For example, in [1] this is shown for the class
of finite planar graphs. (c) The third category contains generalizations of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem.
For example, in [17] the authors, for k ≥ 1 consider sentences of the form ∃x1 . . . ∃xkµ, where µ is
universal. Then the role of the closure under induced substructures is taken over by a semantic “core
property PS(k)” which for k = 0 coincides with closure under induced substructures. Finally, we
mention that in [4] the authors strengthen Tait’s result by showing that for every n ≥ 1 there are first-
order definable classes of finite structures closed under substructures which are not definable with n
quantifier alternations.
Organization of this paper. In Section 2 we fix some notations and recall or derive some results
about universal sentences we need in this paper. For the reader’s convenience, in Section 3 we include
a proof of Tait’s result. Moreover, we prove a technical result, i.e., Proposition 3.11, which is an
important tool in Gurevich’s Theorem. We introduce the concept of strongly existential interpretation
in Section 4 and show that the results of the preceding section remain true under such interpretations.
We present an appropriate strongly existential interpretation for graphs (in Section 5). Hence, we get
the results of Section 3 for graphs. In Section 6 we first derive Gurevich’s Theorem and apply our
interpretations to get the results for graphs. Finally, in Section 7, we prove that various problems
related to our results are undecidable.
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2. Preliminaries
We denote by N the set of natural numbers greater or equal to 0. For n ∈ N let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
First-order logic FO. A vocabulary τ is a finite set of relation symbols. Each relation symbol has
an arity. A structureA of vocabulary τ , or τ -structure, consists of a (finite or infinite) nonempty setA,
called the universe of A and of an interpretation RA ⊆ Ar of each r-ary relation symbol R ∈ τ . If A
and B are τ -structures, then A is a substructure of B, denoted by A ⊆ B, if A ⊆ B and RA ⊆ RB,
and A is an induced substructure of B, denoted by A ⊆ind B, if A ⊆ B and R
A = RB ∩Ar , where r
is the arity of R. If, in addition, A ( B, then A is an proper induced substructure of B. By STR[τ ](
STRfin[τ ]
)
we denote the class of all (of all finite) τ -structures.
Formulas ϕ of first-order logic FO of vocabulary τ are built up from atomic formulas x1 = x2 and
Rx1 . . . xr (where R ∈ τ is of arity r and x1, x2, . . . , xr are variables) using the boolean connectives
¬, ∧, and ∨ and the universal ∀ and existential ∃ quantifiers. A relation symbolR is positive (negative)
in ϕ if all atomic subformulas R . . . in ϕ appear in the scope of an even (odd) number of negation
symbols. By the notation ϕ(x¯) with x¯ = x1, . . . , xe we indicate that the variables free in ϕ are among
x1, . . . , xe. If then A is a τ -structure and a1, . . . , ae ∈ A, then A |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ae) means that ϕ(x¯)
holds in A if xi is interpreted by ai for i ∈ [k].
A sentence is a formula without free variables. For a sentence ϕ we denote by MOD(ϕ) the class
of models of ϕ and MODfin(ϕ) is its subclass consisting of the finite models of ϕ. Sentences ϕ and ψ
are equivalent if MOD(ϕ) = MOD(ψ) and finitely equivalent if MODfin(ϕ) = MODfin(ψ).
Graphs. Let τE := {E}with binaryE. For all τE-structures we use the notationG = (V (G), E(G))
common in graph theory. Here V (G), the universe of G, is the set of vertices, and E(G), the inter-
pretation of the relation symbol E, is the set of edges. The τE-structure G = (V (G), E(G)) is a
directed graph if E(G) does not contain self-loops, i.e., (v, v) /∈ E(G) for any v ∈ V (G). If more-
over (u, v) ∈ E(G) implies (v, u) ∈ E(G) for any pair (u, v), then G is an (undirected) graph. The
graph H = (V (H), E(H)) is an induced subgraph of G if
V (H) ⊆ V (G) and E(H) = E(G) ∩
(
V (H)× V (H)
)
.
We denote by GRAPH and GRAPHfin the class of all graphs and the class of finite graphs, respectively.
Furthermore, for an FO[τE]-sentence ϕ by GRAPH(ϕ)
(
and GRAPHfin(ϕ)
)
we denote the class of
graphs (and the class of finite graphs) that are models of ϕ.
Universal sentences and forbidden induced substructures. An FO-formula is universal if it is
built up from atomic and negated atomic formulas by means of the connectives ∧ and ∨ and the
universal quantifier ∀. Often we say that a formula, say, containing the connective→ is universal if by
replacing ϕ → ψ by ¬ϕ ∨ ψ (and “simple manipulations”) we get an equivalent universal sentence.
Every universal sentence µ is equivalent to a sentence of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 for some k ∈ N and
some quantifier-free µ0 and moreover the length |µ| of µ is at most |ϕ|. If in the definition of universal
formula we replace the universal quantifier by the existential one we get the definition of an existential
formula.
One easily verifies that the class of models of a universal sentence is closed under induced sub-
structures. As already mentioned in the Introduction for classes of graphs, Łos´ [15] and Tarski [19]
proved:
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Theorem 2.1 (Łos´-Tarski Theorem). Let τ be a vocabulary and ϕ an FO[τ ]-sentence. Then MOD(ϕ)
is closed under induced substructures if and only if ϕ is equivalent to a universal sentence.
We fix a vocabulary τ . Let F be a finite set of finite τ -structures and denote by FORB(F ) (and
FORBfin(F )) the class of structures (of finite structures) that do not contain an induced substructure
isomorphic to a structure in F . Clearly for finite sets F and F ′ of finite τ -structures we have
if F ⊆ F ′, then FORB(F ′) ⊆ FORB(F ). (2)
We say that a class C of τ -structures (of finite τ -structures) is definable by a finite set of forbidden
induced substructures if there is a finite set F of finite structures such that C = FORB(F )
(
C =
FORBfin(F )
)
.
Recall that τE = {E} with binary E.
ϕDG := ∀x¬Exx and ϕGRAPH := ∀x¬Exx ∧ ∀x∀y(Exy → Eyx) (3)
axiomatize the classes of directed graphs and of graphs, respectively. Let the τE-structures H0 =
(V (H0), E(H0)) and H1 = (V (H1), E(H1)) be given by
V (H0) := {1}, E(H0) :=
{
(1, 1)
}
and V (H1) := {1, 2}, E(H0) :=
{
(1, 2)
}
.
Then FORB
(
{H0}
)
and FORB
(
{H0,H1}
)
are the class of directed graphs and the class of graphs,
respectively, i.e., MOD(ϕDG) = FORB
(
{H0}
)
and MOD(ϕGRAPH) = FORB
(
{H0,H1}
)
.
The following result generalizes this simple fact and establishes the equivalence between axiom-
atizability by a universal sentence and definability by a finite set of forbidden induced substructures.
For an arbitrary vocabulary τ , an FO[τ ]-sentence ϕ, and k ≥ 1 let
Fk(ϕ) :=
{
A ∈ STR[τ ]
∣∣ A |= ¬ϕ and A = [ℓ] for some ℓ ∈ [k]}. (4)
Thus, Fk(ϕ) is, up to isomorphism, the class of structures with at most k elements which fail to be a
model of ϕ. Note that F1(ϕDG) = {H0} and F1(ϕGRAPH) = {H0,H1}. Clearly, for a τ -sentence we
have:
if MOD(ϕ) is closed under induced substructures,
then MOD(ϕ) ⊆ FORB(Fk(ϕ)) for all k ≥ 1. (5)
Proposition 2.2. For a class C of τ -structures and k ≥ 1 the statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
(i) C = MOD(µ) for some universal sentence µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0.
(ii) C = FORB(F ) for some finite set F of structures, all of at most k elements.
If (i) holds for µ, then C = FORB(Fk(µ)).
Proof : (i)⇒ (ii) Let C = MOD(µ) for µ as in (i). Then MOD(µ) is closed under induced substruc-
tures and hence, C ⊆ FORB
(
Fk(µ)
)
by (5).
Now assume that A /∈ C . Then A |= ¬µ and hence there are a1, . . . , ak ∈ A with A |=
¬µ0(a1, . . . , ak). For B := [a1, . . . , ak]
A, the substructure of A induced by a1, . . . , ak, we have
B |= ¬µ0(a1, . . . , ak) (as µ0 is quantifier-free) and thus, B |= ¬µ. Therefore, B is isomorphic to a
structure in Fk(µ) and therefore, A /∈ FORB
(
Fk(µ)
)
.
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(ii) ⇒ (i) Let the τ -structure A have at most k elements and let a1, . . . , ak be an enumeration of
the elements of A (possibly with repetitions). Let δ(A; a1, . . . , ak) be the conjunction of all literals
(i.e., atomic or negated atomic formulas) λ(x1, . . . , xk) such that A |= λ(a1, . . . , ak). Then for every
τ -structure B and b1, . . . , bk ∈ B we have
B |= δ(A; a1, . . . , ak)(b1, . . . , bk) ⇐⇒ the clauses π(ai) = bi for i ∈ [k]
define an isomorphism from A onto [b1, . . . , bk]
B. (6)
Now assume (ii), i.e., C = FORB(F ) for some finite set F of structures, all of at most k elements.
If F is empty, then C = MOD(∀xx = x). Otherwise for every A ∈ F we fix an enumeration
aA1 , . . . , a
A
k of the elements of A. We set
µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk
∧
A∈F
¬δ(A; aA1 , . . . , a
A
k ).
Then FORB(F ) = MOD(µ). In fact, assume first that B /∈ MOD(µ). Then there are b1, . . . , bk ∈ B
and an A ∈ F such that B |= δ(A; aA1 , . . . , a
A
k )(b1, . . . , bk). By (6), then A is isomorphic to the
induced substructure [b1, . . . , bk]
B of B; hence, B /∈ FORB(F ).
Now assume B /∈ FORB(F ). Then there is an A ∈ F and elements b1, . . . , bk ∈ B such that
the clauses π(aAi ) = bi for i ∈ [k] define an isomorphism from A onto [b1, . . . , bk]
B . By (6), then
B |= δ(A; aA1 , . . . , a
A
k )(b1, . . . , bk). Therefore, B |= ¬µ, i.e., B /∈ MOD(µ). ✷
Corollary 2.3. Let ϕ be a τ -sentence and k ≥ 1. Then
MOD(ϕ) = FORB
(
Fk(ϕ)
)
⇐⇒ ϕ is equivalent to a universal sentence
of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0.
By (2) and (5) we get:
Corollary 2.4. If MOD(µ) = FORB
(
Fk(µ)
)
for some universal µ and some k ∈ N, then MOD(µ) =
FORB
(
Fℓ(µ)
)
for all ℓ ≥ k.
Corollary 2.5. It is decidable whether two universal sentences are equivalent.
Proof : Let µ and µ′ be universal sentences. W.l.o.g. we may assume that µ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 and
µ′ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xℓ µ
′
0 with k ≤ ℓ. By Corollary 2.3 and Corollary 2.4, we have
MOD(µ) = FORB
(
Fℓ(µ)
)
and MOD(µ′) = FORB
(
Fℓ(µ
′)
)
.
Thus µ and µ′ are equivalent if and only if Fℓ(µ) = Fℓ(µ
′). The right hand side of this equivalence
is clearly decidable. ✷
The last equivalence of this corollary shows:
Corollary 2.6. For universal sentences µ and µ′ we have
µ and µ′ are equivalent ⇐⇒ µ and µ′ are finitely equivalent.
The following consequence of Corollary 2.2 will be used in the next section.
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Corollary 2.7. Let m,k ∈ N with m > k and let ψ0 and ψ1 be FO[τ ]-sentences. Assume that A
is a finite model of ψ0 ∧ ψ1 with at least m elements and all its proper induced substructures with
at most k elements are models of ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1. Then ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1 is not finitely equivalent to a universal
sentence of the form µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0.
Proof : For a contradiction assume MODfin(ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1) = MODfin(µ) for µ as above. As MOD(µ) =
FORB
(
Fk(µ)
)
by Proposition 2.2, we get (applying the finitely equivalence of ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1 and µ to
obtain the last equality)
MODfin(ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1) = MODfin(µ) = FORBfin
(
Fk(µ)
)
= FORBfin
(
Fk(ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1)
)
.
However, by the assumptions the structure A is contained in MODfin(ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1) but not in the class
FORBfin(Fk(ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ1)). ✷
Remark 2.8. Let C be a class of τ -structures closed under induced substructures. For an FO[τ ]-
sentence ϕ we set MODC (ϕ) := {A ∈ C | A |= ϕ}. We say that the Łos´-Tarski Theorem holds for C
if for every FO[τ ]-sentence ϕ such that the class MODC (ϕ) is closed under induced substructures
there is a universal sentence µ such that
MODC (ϕ) = MODC (µ).
The following holds:
Let C and C ′ be classes of τ -structures closed under induced substructures with C ′ ⊆ C .
Furthermore assume that there is a universal sentence µ0 such that C
′ = MODC (µ0). If
the analogue of the Łos´-Tarski Theorem holds for C , then it holds for C ′, too
In fact, for every FO[τ ]-sentence ϕ we have MODC ′(ϕ) = MODC (µ0 ∧ ϕ). Hence, if MODC ′(ϕ) is
closed under induced substructures, then by assumption there is a universal µ such that MODC (µ0 ∧
ϕ) = MODC (µ). Therefore, MODC ′(ϕ) = MODC (µ) = MODC ′(µ).
3. Basic ideas underlying the classical results
This section contains a proof of Tait’s Theorem telling us that the analogue of the Łos´-Tarski-Theorem
fails if we only consider finite structures. Afterwards we refine the argument to derive a generalization,
namely Proposition 3.11, which is a key result to get Gurevich’s Theorem.
We consider the vocabulary τ0 := {<,Umin, Umax, S}, where < and S (the successor relation) are
binary relation symbols and Umin and Umax are unary.
Let ϕ0 be the conjunction of the universal sentences
– ∀x¬x < x, ∀x∀y(x < y ∨ x = y ∨ y < x), ∀x∀y∀z((x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z), i.e., “<
is an ordering”
– ∀x∀y
(
(Umin x→ (x = y ∨ x < y)
)
i.e., “every element in Umin is a minimum w.r.t. <”
– ∀x∀y
(
(Umax x→ (x = y ∨ y < x)
)
i.e., “every element in Umax is a maximum w.r.t. <”
– ∀xy(Sxy → x < y)
– ∀x∀y∀z(x < y < z → ¬Sxz).
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Note that from the axioms it follows that there is at most one element in Umin, at most one in Umax,
and that S is a subset of the successor relation w.r.t. <. We call τ0-orderings the models of ϕ0.
For τ0-structures A and B we write B ⊆< A and say that B is a <-substructure of A if A is a
substructure of B with <B=<A ∩ (B ×B).
We remark that the relation symbols Umin, Umax, and S are negative in ϕ0. Therefore we have:
Lemma 3.1. Let B ⊆< A. If A |= ϕ0, then B |= ϕ0.
Let
ϕ1 := ∃xUmin x ∧ ∃xUmax x ∧ ∀x∀y(x < y → ∃zSxz). (7)
We call models of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 complete τ0-orderings. Clearly, for every k ≥ 1 there is a unique, up to
isomorphism, complete τ0-ordering with exactly k elements. The next lemma shows that all its proper
<-substructures are models of ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1.
Lemma 3.2. Let A and B be τ0-structures. Assume that A |= ϕ0 and B is a finite <-substructure
of A that is a model of ϕ1. Then B = A (in particular, A |= ϕ1).
Proof : By the previous lemma we know that B |= ϕ0. Let B := {b1, . . . , bn}. As <
B is an ordering,
we may assume that
b1 <
B b2 <
B . . . <B bn−1 <
B bn.
As B |= (ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1), we have U
B
minb1, U
B
maxbn, and S
Bbibi+1 for i ∈ [n − 1]. As B ⊆ A, everywhere
we can replace the upper index B by A.
We show A = B: Let a ∈ A. ByA |= ϕ0, we have b1 ≤
A a ≤A bn. Let i ∈ [n] be maximal with
bi ≤
A a. If i = n, then bn = a. Otherwise bi ≤
A a <A bi+1. As S
Abibi+1, we see that bi = a (by
the last conjunct of ϕ0). Now A = B follows from A |= ϕ0. ✷
Corollary 3.3. Every proper <-substructure of a finite model of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 is a model of ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1.
The class of finite τ0-orderings that are not complete is closed under <-substructures but not
axiomatizable by a universal sentence:
Theorem 3.4 (Tait’s Theorem). The class MODfin(ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1) is closed under <-substructures (and
hence, closed under induced substructures) but ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1 is not finitely equivalent to a universal
sentence.
Proof : MODfin(ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1) is closed under <-substructures: If A |= ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1 and B is a finite <-
substructure ofA, then B |= ϕ0 (by Lemma 3.1). If B |= ¬ϕ1, we are done. If B |= ϕ1, then A |= ϕ1
by Lemma 3.2, which contradicts our assumption A |= ¬ϕ1.
Let k ∈ N. It is clear that there is a finite model A of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 with at least k + 1 elements.
By Corollary 3.3 every proper induced substructure of A is a model of ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1. Therefore, by
Corollary 2.7, the sentence ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1 is not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence of the form
µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0. As k was arbitrary, we get our claim. ✷
Remark 3.5. A slight generalization of the previous proof shows that MODfin(ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1) is not even
axiomatizable by a Π2-sentence, i.e., by a sentence χ of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃y1 . . . ∃yℓ χ0 for some
k, ℓ ≥ 1 and quantifier-free χ0. In fact, assume that MODfin(ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1) = MODfin(χ). Again we
choose a finite model A of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 with at least k + 1 elements. Then A 6|= χ. Hence there are
a1, . . . , ak ∈ A with A |= ¬∃y1 . . . ∃yℓ χ0(a1, . . . , ak). Then B |= ¬∃y1 . . . ∃yℓ χ0(a1, . . . , ak),
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where B := [a1, . . . , ak]
A is the substructure of A induced by a1, . . . , ak. Hence, B 6|= χ and
therefore, B 6|= ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1. But this contradicts Corollary 3.3 as B is a proper induced substructure
of A.
Note that ϕ0 ∧ ¬ϕ1 is (equivalent to) a Σ2-sentence, i.e., equivalent to the negation of a Π2-
sentence.
We turn to a refinement of the previous statement that will be helpful to get Gurevich’s Theorem.
Definition 3.6. (a) Let τ be obtained from the vocabulary τ0 by adding finitely many relation sym-
bols “in pairs,” the standard R together with its complement Rcomp (intended as the complement
of R). The symbols R and Rcomp have the same arity and for our purposes we can restrict our-
selves to unary or binary relation symbols (even though all results can be generalized to arbitrary
arities). We briefly say that τ is obtained from τ0 by adding pairs.
(b) Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs. We say that ϕ0τ is a τ -extension of ϕ0 (where ϕ0 is
as above) if it is a universal sentence such that
(i) the sentence ϕ0 is a conjunct of ϕ0τ ,
(ii) the sentence
∧
R standard ∀x¯(¬Rx¯ ∨ ¬R
compx¯) is a conjunct of ϕ0τ ,
(iii) besides < all relation symbols are negative in ϕ0τ (if this is not the case for some new R
or Rcomp, the idea is to replace any positive occurrence of R or Rcomp by ¬Rcomp and ¬R,
respectively). For instance, we replace a subformula
x < y ∧Rxy by x < y ∧ ¬Rcompxy.
(c) Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs. Then we set
ϕ1τ := ϕ1 ∧
∧
R standard
∀x¯(Rx¯ ∨Rcompx¯), (8)
where ϕ1 is as above
(
see (7)
)
.
For a τ -structure B with B |= ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ we have
B |=
∧
R standard
(
∀x¯(¬Rx¯ ∨ ¬Rcompx¯) ∧ ∀x¯(Rx¯ ∨Rcompx¯)
)
.
Hence,
if B |= ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ , then (R
comp)B is the complement of RB for standard R ∈ τ . (9)
Now we derive the analogues of Lemma 3.1–Theorem 3.4 essentially by the same proofs.
Lemma 3.7. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. If B ⊆< A
and A |= ϕ0τ , then B |= ϕ0τ .
Proof : By Definition 3.6 (b) (iii) all relation symbols distinct from < are negative in ϕ0τ . ✷
Lemma 3.8. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. Assume
thatA |= ϕ0τ and that the finite <-substructure B ofA is a model of ϕ1τ . Then B = A
(
in particular,
A |= ϕ1τ
)
.
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Proof : LetA ↾ τ0 (and B ↾ τ0) be the τ0-structure obtained fromA (from B) by removing all relations
in τ \ τ0.
By Lemma 3.2 we know that B ↾ τ0 = A ↾ τ0. Furthermore, B |= ϕ0τ by the previous lemma;
thus, B |= ϕ0τ∧ϕ1τ . Hence, by (9), (R
comp)B is the complement ofRB for standardR. Clearly,RB ⊆
RA and (Rcomp)B ⊆ (Rcomp)A. As A = B and A is a model of the sentence
∧
R standard ∀x¯(¬Rx¯ ∨
¬Rcompx¯), we get RB = RA and (Rcomp)B = (Rcomp)A. ✷
Corollary 3.9. Every proper <-substructure of a finite model of ϕ0τ ∧ϕ1τ is a model of ϕ0τ ∧¬ϕ1τ .
By replacing in the proof of Tait’s Theorem the use of Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, and Corollary 3.3
by Lemma 3.7, Lemma 3.8, and Corollary 3.9 respectively, we get:
Lemma 3.10. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. The class
MODfin(ϕ0τ∧¬ϕ1τ ) is closed under<-substructures (and hence, closed under induced substructures)
but ϕ0τ ∧ ¬ϕ1τ is not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence.
Perhaps the reader will ask why we do not introduce for < the “complement relation sym-
bol” <comp and add the corresponding conjuncts to ϕ0τ and ϕ1τ (or, to ϕ0 and ϕ1) in order to get
a result of the type of Lemma 3.8 (or already of the type of Lemma 3.2) where we can replace “<-
substructure” by “substructure.” The reader will realize that corresponding proofs of B = A break
down.
The next proposition provides a uniform way to construct FO-sentences that are only equivalent
to universal sentences of large size, which is the core of the proof of Gurevich’s Theorem.
Proposition 3.11. Again let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0.
Letm ≥ 1 and γ be an FO[τ ]-sentence such that
ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ∧ γ has no infinite model but a finite model with at leastm elements. (10)
For
χ := ϕ0τ ∧ (ϕ1τ → ¬γ)
the statements (a) and (b) hold.
(a) The class MOD(χ) is closed under <-substructures.
(b) If µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0 is finitely equivalent to χ, then k ≥ m.
Proof : (a) LetA |= χ and B ⊆< A. Thus, B |= ϕ0τ . If B 6|= ϕ1τ , we are done. Assume B |= ϕ1τ . In
case B is infinite, we conclude by (10) that B is a model of ¬γ and hence of χ. Otherwise B is finite;
then B = A (by Lemma 3.8) and thus, B |= χ.
(b) According to (10) there is a finite model A of ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ∧ γ, i.e., of ϕ0τ ∧ ¬(ϕ1τ → ¬γ), with
at least m elements. By Corollary 3.9 every proper induced substructure of A is not a model of ϕ1τ
and therefore, it is a model of ϕ0τ ∧ (ϕ1τ → ¬γ). Hence by Corollary 2.7, ϕ0τ ∧ (ϕ1τ → ¬γ)
is not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence of the form µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with k < m and
quantifier-free µ0. ✷
Remark 3.12. We can strengthen the statement (b) of the preceding proposition to:
If the Π2-sentence ∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃y1 . . . ∃yℓ χ0 with quantifier-free χ0 is finitely equivalent
to χ, then k ≥ m.
The proof is similar to that of the result in Remark 3.5 and is left to the reader.
11
4. The general machinery: strongly existential interpretations
We show that appropriate interpretations preserve the validity of Tait’s theorem and of the statement of
Proposition 3.11. Later on these interpretations will allow us to get versions of the results for graphs.
Let τE := {E} with binary E. As already remarked in the Preliminaries for all τE-structures we
use the notation G = (V (G), E(G)) common in graph theory.
Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs. Furthermore, let I be an interpretation of width 2
(we only need this case) of τ -structures in τE-structures. This means that I assigns to every unary
relation symbol T ∈ τ an FO[τE]-formula ϕT (x1, x2) and to every binary relation symbol T ∈ τ an
FO[τE ]-formula ϕT (x1, x2, y1, y2); moreover, I selects an FO[τE ]-formula ϕuni(x1, x2).
Then I assigns to every τE-structure G with G |= ∃x¯ϕuni(x¯) a τ -structure GI , which we often
denote by OI(G), defined by
– OI(G) :=
{
a¯ ∈ V (G)× V (G)
∣∣ G |= ϕuni(a¯)}
– TOI(G) :=
{
a¯ ∈ OI(G)
∣∣ G |= ϕT (a¯)} for unary T ∈ τ
– TOI(G) :=
{
(a¯, b¯) ∈ OI(G)×OI(G)
∣∣ G |= ϕT (a¯, b¯)} for binary T ∈ τ .
As the interpretation I is of width 2, we have
|OI(G)| ≤ |V (G)|
2. (11)
Recall that for every sentence ϕ ∈ FO[τ ] there is a sentence ϕI ∈ FO[τE ] such that for all τE-
structures G with G |= ∃x¯ϕuni(x¯) we have
(GI =) OI(G) |= ϕ ⇐⇒ G |= ϕ
I . (12)
For example, for the sentence ϕ = ∀x∀y Txy we have
ϕI = ∀x¯
(
ϕuni(x¯)→ ∀y¯
(
ϕuni(y¯)→ ϕT (x¯, y¯)
))
.
Furthermore there is a constant cI ∈ N such that for all ϕ ∈ FO[τ ],
|ϕI | ≤ cI · |ϕ|. (13)
Definition 4.1. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and let I be an interpretation of τ0-structures
in τE as just described. We say that I is strongly existential if all formulas of I are existential and ϕ<
is even quantifier-free.
Lemma 4.2. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs and let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. Then for
every strongly existential interpretation I the sentence ϕI0τ is (equivalent to) a universal sentence.
Proof : The claim holds as all relation symbols distinct from < are negative in ϕ0τ . For example, for
ϕ := ∀x∀y
(
Umin x→ (x = y ∨ x < y)
)
, we have
ϕI = ∀x¯
(
ϕuni(x¯)→ ∀y¯
(
ϕuni(y¯)→ (ϕUmin(x¯)→ ((x1 = y1 ∧ x2 = y2) ∨ ϕ<(x¯, y¯)))
))
. ✷
The following result shows that strongly existential interpretations preserve induced substructures in
such a way that we can translate the results of the preceding section to the actual context.
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Lemma 4.3. Assume that I is strongly existential. Then for all τE-structures G andH withH ⊆ind G
and OI(H) 6= ∅, we have OI(H) ⊆< OI(G).
Proof : As ϕuni is existential, we have OI(H) ⊆ OI(G). Let T ∈ τ be distinct from < and b¯ ∈
TOI(H). Then H |= ϕT (b¯). As ϕT is existential, G |= ϕT (b¯) and thus, b¯ ∈ T
OI(G). Moreover, for
b¯, b¯′ ∈ OI(H) we have
b¯ <OI(H) b¯′ ⇐⇒ H |= ϕ<(b¯, b¯
′)
⇐⇒ G |= ϕ<(b¯, b¯
′) (as H ⊆ind G and ϕ< is quantifier-free)
⇐⇒ b¯ <OI(G) b¯′.
Putting all together we see that OI(H) ⊆< OI(G). ✷
We obtain from Lemma 3.8 the corresponding result in our framework.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that I is strongly existential. Let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. Let G be a τE-
structure and G |= ϕI0τ . Let H ⊆ind G with finite OI(H). If H |= ϕ
I
1τ , then OI(H) = OI(G) and
G |= ϕI1τ .
Proof : As H |= ϕI1τ , in particular H |= (∃xUmin x)
I ; thus, OI(H) 6= ∅. Therefore, OI(H) ⊆<
OI(G) by Lemma 4.3. By assumption and (12), OI(G) |= ϕ0τ and OI(H) |= ϕ1τ . As OI(H) is
finite, Lemma 3.8 implies OI(H) = OI(G), and in particular OI(G) |= ϕ1τ . Hence, G |= ϕ
I
1τ
by (12). ✷
We now prove for strongly existential interpretations two results, Proposition 4.5 corresponds
to Tait’s Theorem (Theorem 3.4), and Proposition 4.6 corresponds to Proposition 3.11 (relevant to
Gurevich’s Theorem). In our application of these results to graphs in the next section the sentence ψ
will be ∀x¬Exx ∧ ∀x∀y(Exy → Eyx), i.e., the sentence ϕGRAPH
(
cf. (3)
)
axiomatizing the class of
graphs.
Proposition 4.5. Let ψ be a universal τE-sentence. Assume that the interpretation I of τ0-structures
in τE-structures is strongly existential. Furthermore, assume that for every sufficiently large finite
complete τ0-ordering A there is a finite τE-structure G with OI(G) ∼= A and G |= ψ. Then there is
an FO[τE]-sentence ϕ such that MODfin(ψ ∧ ϕ) is closed under induced substructures, but ψ ∧ ϕ is
not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence.
As ϕ we an take the sentence
ϕ := ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨
(
ϕI0 ∧ ¬ϕ
I
1
)
(
for the definition of ϕ0 and ϕ1 see page 8 and (7), respectively
)
.
Proof : First we verify that the class MODfin(ψ ∧ ϕ) is closed under induced substructures. Assume
G |= ψ ∧ ϕ and H ⊆ind G. Since ψ is universal, we have H |= ψ. If G |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯), then
H |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯). Now assume thatG |= ϕ
I
0∧¬ϕ
I
1. ThenH |= ϕ
I
0, as ϕ
I
0 is universal by Lemma 4.2.
If H |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) or H |= ¬ϕ
I
1, we are done. Otherwise OI(H) 6= ∅ and H |= ϕ
I
1. Then G |= ϕ
I
1
(see Lemma 4.4), a contradiction.
Finally we show that for every k ∈ N the sentence ψ ∧ϕ is not finitely equivalent to a sentence of the
form µ = ∀z1 . . . ∀zk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0. Let
A :=
(
A,<A, UAmin, U
A
max, S
A
)
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be a complete τ0-ordering with at least k
2 + 1 elements. In particular, A |= ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1. By assumption
we can choose A in such a way that there is a finite τE-structure G such that OI(G) ∼= A and G |= ψ.
Then OI(G) |= ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, hence, G |= ϕ
I
0 ∧ ϕ
I
1. Thus G |= ψ ∧ ¬ϕ. As |OI(G)| = |A| ≥ k
2 + 1, the
graph G must contain more than k elements by (11).
We want to show that every induced substructure of G with at most k elements is a model of
ψ ∧ ϕ. Then the result follows from Corollary 2.7. So let H be an induced substructure of G with at
most k elements. Clearly, H |= (ψ ∧ϕI0). IfH |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) or H |= ¬ϕ
I
1, we are done. Otherwise
OI(H) 6= ∅ and H |= ϕ
I
1. Then, Lemma 4.4 implies OI(H) = OI(G). Recall |V (H)| ≤ k, so
OI(H) has at most k
2 elements by (11), a contradiction as |OI(G)| ≥ k
2 + 1. ✷
Proposition 4.6. Assume that ψ is a universal τE-sentence. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding
pairs and let ϕ0τ be an extension of ϕ0. Let I be a strongly existential interpretation of τ -structures
in τE-structures with the property that for every finite τ -structure A, which is a model of ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ,
there is a finite τE-structure G with OI(G) ∼= A and G |= ψ.
Letm ≥ 1 and γ be an FO[τ ]-sentence such that
ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ∧ γ has no infinite model but a finite model with at leastm elements. (14)
For
ρ := ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨
(
ϕ0τ ∧ (ϕ1τ → ¬γ)
)I
(15)
the statements (a) and (b) hold.
(a) The class MOD(ψ ∧ ρ) is closed under induced substructures.
(b) If µ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xk µ0 with quantifier-free µ0 is finitely equivalent to ψ ∧ ρ, then k
2 ≥ m.
Proof : (a) Assume that G |= ψ ∧ ρ and H ⊆ind G. Clearly H |= ψ. If H |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯), then we
are done. Otherwise, the universe of OI(H) and hence, that of OI(G), are not empty. Then G |= ϕ
I
0τ
and asH ⊆ind G, we have H |= ϕ
I
0τ by Lemma 4.2.
If H 6|= ϕI1τ , we are done. Otherwise, H |= ϕ
I
1τ . If HI is infinite, then HI |= ¬γ by (14) and we
are again done. If HI is finite, then OI(H) = OI(G) by Lemma 4.4. Thus OI(G) |= ϕ1τ and hence,
OI(G) |= ¬γ as G |= ρ. Therefore, OI(H) |= ¬γ and thus, H |= ρ.
(b) By (14) there is a finite model A of ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ∧ γ with at least m elements. By assumption
there is a finite τE-structure G with OI(G) ∼= A and G |= ψ. Clearly, G |= ¬∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) and
G |= (ϕ0τ ∧ ϕ1τ ∧ γ)
I . Hence, G |= ψ ∧ ¬ρ. Assume that k2 < m. We want to show that every
induced substructure of G with at most k elements is a model of ψ ∧ ρ. Then the claim (b) follows
from Corollary 2.7.
So let H be an induced substructure of G with at most k elements. Clearly, H |= (ψ ∧ ϕI0τ ).
If H |= ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) or H |= ¬ϕ
I
1τ , we are done. Otherwise OI(H) 6= ∅ and H |= ϕ
I
1τ . Then,
OI(H) = OI(G) by Lemma 4.4. This leads to a contradiction, as OI(H) has at most k
2 elements
by (12), while OI(G) hasm elements and we assumed k
2 < m. ✷
Remark 4.7. The results corresponding to Remark 3.5 and Remark 3.12 are valid for Proposition 4.5
and Proposition 4.6 too. In particular, the sentence ψ ∧ ϕ
(
= ψ ∧ ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨
(
ϕI0 ∧ ¬ϕ
I
1
))
is
not equivalent to a Π2-sentence. Furthermore ψ ∧ ϕ itself is equivalent to a Σ2-sentence. In fact, as
all relation symbols besides < are negative in ϕ0, the sentence ϕ
I
0 is universal. Moreover, as Umin,
Umax, and S are positive in ϕ1, the sentence ϕ
I
1 (as ϕ1) is equivalent to a Π2-sentence. Hence ψ ∧ ϕ
is equivalent to a Σ2-sentence.
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Figure 1. A path of length 6 with a 4-ear.
5. Tait’s Theorem for finite graphs
In this section we introduce a strongly existential interpretation, which allows us to get Tait’s Theorem
for graphs. The corresponding result for Gurevich’s Theorem will be derived in Section 6.
We first introduce a further concept. Let G be a graph and a, b ∈ V (G). For r, s ≥ 3 a path from
vertex a to vertex b of length r with an s-ear is a path between a and b with a cycle of length s; one
vertex of this cycle is adjacent to the vertex adjacent to b on the path. Figure 1 is a path from a to b of
length 6 with a 4-ear.
Lemma 5.1. For r, s ≥ 3 there are quantifier-free formulas ϕcr(x, z¯) and ϕpe,r,s(x, y, z¯, w¯) such that
for all graphs G we have
(a) G |= ϕcr(a, u¯) ⇐⇒ u¯ is a cycle of length r containing a.
(b) G |= ϕpe,r,s(a, b, u¯, v¯) ⇐⇒ u¯ is path from a to b of length r with the s-ear v¯.
Proof : (a) We can take as ϕcr(x, z1, . . . , zr) the formula
x = z1 ∧ Ezrz1 ∧
∧
1≤i<r
Ezizi+1 ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤r
¬zi = zj .
(b) We can take as ϕpe,r,s(x, y, z0, . . . , zr, w1, . . . , ws) the formula
x = z0 ∧ y = zr ∧
∧
0≤i<r−1
Ezizi+1 ∧
∧
0≤i<j≤r
¬zi = zj ∧
∧
0≤i≤r, j∈[s]
¬zi = wj
∧ ϕcs(w1, w1, . . . , wr) ∧ Ezr−1w1. ✷
To understand better how we obtain the desired interpretation we first assign to every complete τ0-
ordering A, i.e., to every model of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, a τE-structure G := G(A) which is a graph.
In a first step we extend A to a τ∗0 -structure A
∗, where τ∗0 := τ0 ∪ {B,C,L, F} in the following
way. Here B,C are unary and L,F are binary relation symbols.
For every original (or, basic) element a, i.e., for every a ∈ A, we introduce a new element a′, the
companion of a. We set
– A∗ := A ∪ {a′ | a ∈ A},
– BA
∗
:= A, CA
∗
:= {a′ | a ∈ A},
– LA
∗
:=
{
(a, a′)
∣∣ a ∈ A}, FA∗ := {(a′, b), (b, a′) ∣∣ a, b ∈ A, a <A b}.
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Figure 2. Turning an ordering to the relation F .
Note that the relation F is irreflexive and symmetric, i.e.,
(
A∗, FA
∗
)
is already a graph, which is
illustrated by Figure 2. Observe that F contains the whole information of the ordering <A up to
isomorphism.
We use A∗ to define the desired graph G = G(A). The vertex set V (G) contains the elements
of A∗, and the edge relation E(G) contains FA
∗
. Furthermore G contains just all the vertices and
edges required by the following items:
– To a ∈ UAmin we add a cycle of length 5 consisting of new vertices, i.e., not in A
∗ (besides a).
– To a ∈ UAmax we add a cycle of length 7 consisting of new vertices (besides a).
– To a ∈ BA
∗
we add a cycle of length 9 consisting of new vertices (besides a).
– To a ∈ CA
∗
we add a cycle of length 11 consisting of new vertices (besides a).
– To (a, b) ∈ SA we add a path from a to b of length 17 with a 13-ear consisting of new vertices
(besides a and b).
– To (a, a′) ∈ LA
∗
we add a path from a to a′ of length 17 with a 15-ear consisting of new
vertices (besides a and a′).
Hereby we meant by “add a cycle” or “add a path with an ear” that we only add the edges required by
the corresponding formulas in Lemma 5.1.
To ease the discussion, we divide cycles in G (= G(A)) into four categories.
[F -cycle] These are cycles in
(
A∗, FA
∗
)
, i.e., cycles using only edges of FA
∗
.
[T -cycle] For every unary T ∈
{
Umin, Umax, B,C
}
, a T -cycle is the cycle introduced for an a ∈ TA.
[ear-cycle] These are the cycles constructed as ears on the gadgets for the relations SA
∗
and LA
∗
.
[mixed-cycle] All the other cycles are mixed.
For example, we get a mixed cycle if we start with a2, a
′
0, a1 in Figure 2 and then add the path
introduced for (a1, a2) ∈ S
A (ignoring the ear).
A number of observations for these types of cycles are in order.
Lemma 5.2. (i) All the F -cycles are of even length.1
(ii) Every Umin-, Umax-, B-, and C-cycle is of length 5, 7, 9, and 11, respectively.
(iii) Every ear-cycle is of length 13 or 15.
1Moreover one can show that every chordless F -cycle has length 4.
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(iv) Every mixed-cycle neither uses new vertices of any T -cycle for T ∈
{
Umin, Umax, B,C
}
nor
any vertex of any ear-cycle.
(v) Every mixed-cycle has length at least 17.
Proof : (i) follows easily from the fact that
(
A∗, FA
∗
)
is a bipartite graph; (ii) and (iii) are trivial.
For (iv) assume that a mixed-cycle uses a new vertex b of a T -cycle C introduced for some a ∈ TA
∗
,
where T ∈
{
Umin, Umax, B,C
}
. As C is mixed, it must contain a vertex c /∈ TA
∗
. To reach b from c
the mixed cycle must pass through a and hence must contain one of the two segments of C between b
and a. As a consequence, in order for the mixed-cycle to go back from b to c, it must also use the other
segment of C between a and b. This means that it must be the T -cycle C itself, instead of a mixed one.
A similar argument shows that mixed cycles do not contain vertices of any ear-cycle.
To prove (v), let C be a mixed-cycle. By (iv), C must contain all vertices of a (at least one) path
introduced for a pair (a, a′) ∈ LA∗ or (a, b) ∈ SA
∗
(ignoring the ear). As this path has length 17, we
get our claim. ✷
Conversely, given a τE-structure G, which is a graph, we construct a τ0-structure which we denote
by O(G), possibly the empty structure. Recall the definitions of “cycle” and of “path with ear” given
by Lemma 5.1.
– O(G) :=
{
(a1, a2) ∈ V (G) × V (G)
∣∣ a1 is a member of a cycle of length 9, a2 is a member
of a cycle of length 11, and there is a path from a1 to a2 of length 17 with a 15-ear
}
– <O(G):=
{
((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) ∈ O(G) ×O(G)
∣∣ {a2, b1} ∈ E(G)}
– U
O(G)
min :=
{
(a1, a2) ∈ O(G)
∣∣ a1 is a member of a cycle of 5 elements}
– U
O(G)
max :=
{
(a1, a2) ∈ O(G)
∣∣ a1 is a member of a cycle of 7 elements}
– SO(G) :=
{
((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) ∈ O(G)×O(G) | there is a path from a1 to b1 of length 17
with a 13-ear
}
.
Lemma 5.3. For every complete τ0-ordering A we have O(G(A)) ∼= A.
Proof : Let G := G(A) and A+ := O(G). We claim that the mapping h : A→ A+ defined by
h(a) := (a, a′) for a ∈ A
is an isomorphism from A to A+. To that end, we first prove that
A+ =
{
(a, a′)
∣∣ a ∈ A},
which implies that h is well defined and a bijection. For every a ∈ A it is easy to see that (a, a′) ∈
O(G) (= A+). For the converse, let (a1, a2) ∈ O(G). In particular, a1 is a member of a cycle
of length 9. By Lemma 5.2, this must be a B-cycle which contains some a ∈ A. Using the same
argument, a2 is a member of a C-cycle which contains a vertex b
′ being the companion of some
b ∈ A. Furthermore, there is a path from a1 to a2 of length 17 with a 15-ear. The 15-ear is a cycle of
length 15. Again by Lemma 5.2 this cycle is an ear-cycle which belongs to the gadget we introduced
for some (c, c′) ∈ LA
∗
with c ∈ A. Then it is easy to see that a = c = b. This finishes the proof that
h is a bijection from A to A+.
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Similarly, we can prove that h preserves all the relations. ✷
We want to show that we can obtain O(G) from G by a strongly existential FO-interpretation. We set
η(x, x′, x¯, x¯′, z¯, w¯) := “x¯ is a cycle of length 9 containing x, x¯′ is a cycle of length 11 containing x′,
and z¯ is a path from x to x′ of length 17 with the 15-ear w¯”
= ϕc9(x, x¯) ∧ ϕc11(x
′, x¯′) ∧ ϕpe,17,15(x, x
′z¯, w¯).
We define the desired interpretation I of width 2 of τ0-structures in graphs. We set
ϕuni(x, x
′) := ∃x¯∃x¯′∃z¯∃w¯ η(x, x′, x¯, x¯′, z¯, w¯).
Hence for every graph G,
OI(G) =
{
(a1, a2) ∈ V (G)× V (G)
∣∣ G |= ∃x¯∃x¯′∃z¯∃w¯ η(a1, a2, x¯, x¯′, z¯, w¯)}.
Furthermore we define
– ϕUmin(x, x
′) := ∃z¯ ϕc5(x, z¯),
– ϕUmax(x, x
′) := ∃z¯ ϕc7(x, z¯),
– ϕS(x, x
′, y, y′) := ∃z¯∃w¯ “z¯ is a path of length 17 from x to y with a 13-ear w¯”
= ∃z¯∃w¯ϕpe,17,13(x, z¯, w¯).
Then we have:
Lemma 5.4. The interpretation I given by
(
ϕuni, ϕ<, ϕUmin , ϕUmax , ϕS
)
is strongly existential. For
every complete τ0-ordering A we have OI(G(A)) = O(G(A)) and hence, by Lemma 5.3,
OI(G(A)) ∼= A.
Setting ψ := ϕGRAPH, the sentence axiomatizing the class of graphs, we get from Proposition 4.5:
Theorem 5.5 (Tait’s Theorem for graphs). There is a τE-sentence ϕ such that GRAPHfin(ϕ), the class
of finite graphs that are models of ϕ, is closed under induced subgraphs but ϕ is not equivalent to a
universal sentence in finite graphs.
In this section we presented a strongly existential interpretation of τ0-structures and applied it
to finite complete τ0-orderings, i.e, to models of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1. A straightforward generalization of the
preceding proofs allows to show the following result for vocabularies obtained from τ0 by adding
pairs. We shall use it in Section 6.
Lemma 5.6. Let τ be obtained from τ0 by adding pairs. There is a strongly existential interpretation
I (= Iτ ) that for every extension ϕ0τ of ϕ0 assigns to every τ -structure A that is a model of ϕ0τ ∧ϕ1τ
a graph G(A) with OI(G(A)) ∼= A. For finite A the graph G(A) is finite.
Proof : We get the graph G(A) as in the case τ := τ0: For the elements of new unary relations we add
cycles such that the lengths of the cycles are odd and distinct for distinct unary relations in τ . Let c be
the maximal length of these cycles. Then we add paths with ears to the tuples of binary relations as
above. For distinct binary relations the ears should have distinct length and again this length should
be odd and greater than c. On the other hand, the length of added new paths can be the same for all
binary relations but should be greater than the length of all the cycles. ✷
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Remark 5.7. (a) Let C := MODfin(∀x¬Exx) be the class of directed graphs. Then C
′ := GRAPHfin,
the class of finite graphs, is a subclass of C closed under induced substructures and definable in C by
the universal sentence ∀x∀y(Exy → Eyx). As the Łos´-Tarski Theorem fails for the class of finite
graphs, it fails for the class of directed graphs by Remark 2.8.
(b) Now let C := GRAPHfin and C
′ := PLANARfin be the class of finite planar graphs, a subclass
of GRAPHfin closed under induced subgraphs. As mentioned in the Introduction, in [1] it is shown
that the Łos´-Tarski Theorem fails for PLANARfin. As PLANARfin is not axiomatizable in GRAPHfin by
a universal sentence, not even by a first-order sentence, we do not get the failure of the Łos´-Tarski
Theorem for the class of finite graphs, i.e., Tait’s Theorem for graphs, by applying the result of Re-
mark 2.8. We show that PLANARfin = FORBfin(F ) for a finite set F of finite graphs (or, equivalently,
PLANARfin = MODfin(µ) for a universal µ) leads to a contradiction. Let k be the maximum size of
the set of vertices of graphs in F . Let G be the graph obtained from the clique K5 of 5 vertices by
subdividing each edge by k+ 1. Clearly, G /∈ PLANARfin. However, every subgraph of G induced on
at most k elements is planar. Hence, G ∈ FORBfin(F ).
(c) Let τ be any vocabulary with at least one at least binary relation T . Then the Łos´-Tarski Theorem
fails for the class C := STRfin[τ ], the class of all finite τ -structures. By Remark 2.8 it suffices to show
the existence of a universally definable subclass C ′ of C which “essentially is the class of graphs.”
We set
µ := ∀x∀u¯¬Txxu¯ ∧ ∀x∀y∀u¯∀v¯(Txyu¯→ Tyxv¯) ∧
∧
R∈τ, R6=T
∀u¯¬Ru¯
and let C ′ be MODfin(µ).
If τ only contains unary relation symbols, the Łos´-Tarski Theorem holds for STRfin[τ ]. It is easy
to see for an FO(τ)-sentence ϕ that the closure under induced substructures of MODfin(ϕ) implies
that of MOD(ϕ).
6. Gurevich’s Theorem
The following discussion will eventually lead to a proof of Gurevich’s Theorem, i.e., Theorem 1.5.
Our proof essentially follows Gurevich’s proof in [14], but it contains some elements of Rossman’s
proof of the same result in [16]. 2 Afterwards we show that it remains true if we restrict ourselves to
graphs.
Our main tool is Proposition 3.11, and the goal is to construct a formula γ in (10) whose size is much
smaller than the number m. Basically γ will describe a very long computation of a Turing machine
on a short input. We fix a universal Turing machineM operating on an one-way infinite tape, the tape
alphabet is {0, 1}, where 0 is also considered as blank, and Q is the set of states of M . The initial
state is q0, and qh is the halting state; thus q0, qh ∈ Q and we assume that q0 6= qh. An instruction of
M has the form
qapbd,
where q, p ∈ Q, a, b ∈ {0, 1} and d ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. It indicates that ifM is in state q and the head ofM
reads an a, then the head replaces a by b and moves to the left (if d = −1), stays still (if d = 0), or
moves to the right (if d = 1). In order to describe computations of M by FO-formulas we introduce
binary predicates Hq(x, t) for q ∈ Q to indicate that at time t the machine is in state q and the head
scans cell x, and a binary predicate C0(x, t) to indicate that the content of cell x at time t is 0.
2The reader of [14] will realize that the definition of ϕn on page 190 of [14] must be modified in order to ensure that the
class of models of ϕn is closed under induced substructures.
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The vocabulary τM is obtained from τ0 by adding pairs
(
see Definition 3.6 (a)
)
,
τM := τ0 ∪
{
Hq,H
comp
q
∣∣ q ∈ Q} ∪ {C0, Ccomp0 }.
Intuitively, H
comp
q (x, t) says that “at time t the machine is not in state q or the head is not in cell x;”
and C
comp
0 (x, t) says that “at time t the content of cell x is (not 0 and thus is) 1.” Sometimes we write
C1 instead of C
comp
0 (e.g., below in ϕ2 if a = 1 or b = 0).
Let ϕ0 and ϕ1 be the sentences already introduced in Section 3. For w ∈ {0, 1}
∗ the sentence ϕ0w
will be an extension of ϕ0
(
compare Definition 3.6 (b)
)
; hence, ϕ0w will be a universal sentence and
all relations symbols besides < are negative in ϕ0w; in particular, it contains as conjuncts ϕ0 and
∀x∀t
(
¬C0(x, t) ∨ ¬C
comp
0 (x, t)
)
∧
∧
q∈Q
∀x∀t
(
¬Hq(x, t) ∨ ¬H
comp
q (x, t)
)
.
Finally, ϕ0w will contain the following sentences ϕ2 and ϕw as conjuncts. The sentence ϕ2 describes
one computation step. It contains for each instruction ofM one conjunct. For example, the instruction
qapb1 contributes the conjunct
∀xx′∀tt′∀y
((
Hq(x, t) ∧ Ca(x, t) ∧ S(x, x
′) ∧ S(t, t′)
)
→
(
(¬C1−b(x, t
′) ∧ ¬Hcompp (x
′, t′))
∧ (y 6= x′ →
∧
r∈Q
¬Hr(y, t
′))
∧ (y 6= x→ ((C0(y, t)→ ¬C
comp
0 (y, t)) ∧ (C
comp
0 (y, t
′)→ ¬C0(y, t
′))))
))
.
For w ∈ {0, 1}∗ the sentence ϕw describes the initial configuration of M with input w
(
if w =
w1 . . . w|w|, the first |w| cells contain w1, . . . , w|w|, the remaining cells contain 0, and the head scans
the first cell in the starting state q0
)
. Hence, as ϕw we can take the conjunction of
– ∀x1 . . . ∀x|w|
(
(Umin x1 ∧
∧
i∈[|w|−1] Sxixi+1)
→ (
∧
i∈[|w|],
wi=0
¬Ccomp0 (xi, x1) ∧
∧
i∈[|w|],
wi=1
¬C0(xi, x1))
)
– ∀x1 . . . ∀x|w|∀x
(
(Umin x1 ∧
∧
i∈[|w|−1] Sxixi+1 ∧ x|w| < x)→ ¬C
comp
0 (x, x1)
)
– ∀x∀y
(
Umin x→ (¬H
comp
q0 (x, x) ∧ (y 6= x→
∧
q∈Q ¬Hq(y, x)))
)
.
Note that Umin, Umax, and S are negative in ϕ0w. We set ϕ1M := ϕ1τM ; recall that by Defini-
tion 3.6 (c),
ϕ1M = ϕ1 ∧ ∀x∀t
(
C0(x, t) ∨ C
comp
0 (x, t)
)
∧
∧
q∈Q
∀x∀t
(
Hq(x, t) ∨H
comp
q (x, t)
)
.
Let w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and r ∈ N. Furthermore, let A be a τM -structure where <
A is an ordering and
|A| ≥ r+1. Let a0, . . . , ar be the first r+1 elements of<
A. Assume thatM on the input w ∈ {0, 1}∗
runs at least r steps. We say that A correctly encodes r steps of the computation ofM on w if for i, j
with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ r,
(ai, aj) ∈ C
A
0 ⇐⇒ the content of cell i after j steps is 0 (16)
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and for q ∈ Q,
(ai, aj) ∈ H
A
q ⇐⇒ after j stepsM is in state q and the head scans cell j. (17)
From the definitions of the sentences ϕ0w and ϕ1M , we see:
Lemma 6.1. Let w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and A be a model ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M . If for r ∈ N we have r + 1 ≤ |A| (in
particular, if A is infinite) and M on w runs at least r steps, then A correctly encodes r steps of the
computation ofM on w.
Finally, let γM be a sentence expressing that “the machine M reaches the halting state qh in exactly
‘max’ steps,” more precisely,
γM := ∃t∃x
(
Umaxt ∧Hqh(x, t) ∧ ∀t
′∀y(t′ < t→ ¬Hqh(y, t
′))
)
. (18)
As a consequence of the preceding lemma, we obtain:
Corollary 6.2. Let w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and assume that M on input w eventually halts, say in h(w) steps,
then
ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM
has no infinite model but a model with exactly h(w) + 1 elements (this model is unique up to isomor-
phism).
Proof : Let A |= ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM . Then A ↾ τ0 is a complete τ0-ordering and A contains the
description of the complete halting computation ofM on the input w. As the machineM reaches the
halting state in exactly h(w) steps, we see that |A| = h(w) + 1; in particular, A is finite.
On the other hand, we can interpret (16) and (17) as defining relations CA0 and H
A
q on the set
A :=
{
a0, . . . , ah(w)
}
equipped with the “natural” ordering and its corresponding relations Umin,
Umax, and S. If furthermore we let (C
comp
0 )
A and (H
comp
q )A be the complements in A × A of CA0
and HAq , respectively, we get a model of ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM with exactly h(w) + 1 elements. ✷
We set
χw := ϕ0w ∧ (ϕ1M → ¬γM ). (19)
By Proposition 3.11 and Corollary 6.2, we get:
Lemma 6.3. LetM on input w eventually halt, say in h(w) steps. Then:
(a) MOD(χw) is closed under <-substructures.
(b) If χw is finitely equivalent to a universal sentence µ, then |µ| ≥ h(w) + 1.
Now we show the following version of Gurevich’s Theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Let f : N → N be a computable function. Then there is a w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that
MOD(χw) is closed under <-substructures but χw is not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence of
length less than f(|χw|).
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Proof : By the previous lemma it suffices to find a w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such thatM on input w halts in h(w)
steps with
h(w) ≥ f(|χw|).
W.l.o.g. we assume that f is increasing. An analysis of the formula χw shows that for some cM ∈ N
we have for all w ∈ {0, 1}∗,
|χw| ≤ cM · |w|. (20)
We define g : N→ N by
g(k) := f(5 · cM · k). (21)
Let M0 be a Turing machine computing g, more precisely, the function 1
k 7→ 1g(k). We code M0
and 1k by a {0, 1}-string code(M0, 1
k) such that M on code(M0, 1
k) simulates the computation
ofM0 on 1
k .
Choose the least k such that for w := code(M0, 1
k) we have
|w| ≤ 5k. (22)
The universal Turing machine M on input w computes 1g(k) and thus runs at least g(k) steps, say,
exactly h(w) steps. By (20) – (22)
h(w) ≥ g(k) = f(5 · cM · k) ≥ f(cM · |w|) ≥ f(|χw|). ✷
Finally we prove Gurevich’s Theorem for graphs. For τ := τM let I be an interpretation according to
Lemma 5.6. For w ∈ {0, 1}∗ we consider the sentence
ρw := ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ (ϕ0w ∧ (ϕ1M → ¬γM ))
I = ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ χ
I
w. (23)
That is, for G |= ρw, either the graph G interprets an empty τM -structure, or a τM -structure which
is a model of χw. IfM halts in h(w) steps on input w, then ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM has no infinite model
but a finite model with h(w) + 1 elements by Corollary 6.2. Hence taking in Proposition 4.6 as ψ the
sentence ψGRAPH axiomatizing the class of graphs we get the following analogue of Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 6.5. LetM on input w halt in h(w) steps. Then:
(a) GRAPH(ρw), the class of graphs that are model of ρw, is closed under induced subgraphs (and
hence equivalent in the class of graphs to a universal sentence).
(b) If ρw is equivalent in the class of finite graphs to a universal sentence µ, then |µ|
2 ≥ h(w).
Theorem 6.6 (Gurevich’s Theorem for graphs). Let f : N → N be a computable function. Further-
more, let ρw be defined by (23), where I is an interpretation for τ := τM according to Lemma 5.6.
Then there is a w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that GRAPH(ρw) is closed under induced subgraphs but ρw is not
equivalent in the class of finite graphs to a universal sentence of length less than f(|ρw|).
Proof : Again we assume that f is increasing. By the previous lemma it suffices to find a w ∈ {0, 1}∗
such thatM on input w halts in h(w) steps with
h(w) ≥ f(|ρw|)
2.
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There is a c ∈ N, which depends on I but not on w, such that for cI as in (13) and cM as in (20) we
have for dM := c+ cI · cM ,
|ρw| ≤ c+ cI · |χw| ≤ c+ cI · cM · |w| ≤ dM · |w|. (24)
We define g : N→ N by
g(k) := f(5 · dM · k)
2 (25)
and then proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6.4. LetM0 be a Turing machine computing the function
1k 7→ 1g(k). We code M0 and 1
k by a {0, 1}-string code(M0, 1
k) such that M on code(M0, 1
k)
simulates the computation ofM0 on 1
k.
Choose the least k such that for w := code(M0, 1
k) we have
|w| ≤ 5k. (26)
The universal Turing machine M on input w computes 1g(k) and thus runs at least g(k) steps, say,
exactly h(w) steps. We have
h(w) ≥ g(k) = f(5 · dM · k)
2 ≥ f(dM · |w|)
2 ≥ f(|ρw|)
2
by (24) – (26). ✷
Remark 6.7. Using previous remarks (Remark 3.12 and Remark 4.7) one can even show that for
every computable function f : N → N the sentence χw is not finitely equivalent to a Π2-sentence of
length less than f(|χw|) and the sentence ρw is not finitely equivalent in graphs to a Π2-sentence of
length less than f(|χw|). Moreover, χw and ρw are equivalent to Σ2.
For this purpose note that in models of ϕ0w the sentence γM is equivalent to
∃t∃x
(
Umaxt ∧Hqh(x, t)
)
∧ ∀t1∀t2∀y
(
t1 < t2 → ¬Hqh(y, t2)
)
.
and hence equivalent to a Σ2 and to a Π2-sentence. One easily verifies that the same holds for γ
I
M .
7. Some undecidable problems
In this section we show that various problems related to the results of the preceding sections are
undecidable. Among others, these results explain why it might be hard, in fact impossible in general,
to obtain forbidden induced subgraphs for various classes of graphs.
Proposition 7.1. There is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τE ]-sentence ϕ decides whether the
class GRAPH(ϕ) is closed under induced subgraphs.
Proof : Assume A is such an algorithm. By the Completeness Theorem there is an algorithm B that
assigns to every sentence ϕ with GRAPH(ϕ) closed under induced subgraphs a universal sentence
equivalent to ϕ in graphs. Define the function g by
g(ϕ) :=
{
0, if A rejects ϕ
m, B needs m steps to produce a universal sentence equivalent to ϕ
and set f(k) := max{g(ϕ) | |ϕ| ≤ k}. Then f would contradict Gurevich’s Theorem for graphs, i.e.,
Theorem 6.6. ✷
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Corollary 7.2. There is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τE]-sentence ϕ either reports that
GRAPH(ϕ) is not closed under induced subgraphs or it computes for GRAPH(ϕ) a class of forbidden
induced subgraphs.
Proof : Otherwise we could use this algorithm as a decision algorithm for the previous result. ✷
The following proposition is the analog of Proposition 7.1 for classes of finite graphs. We state
it for FO[τE ]-sentences and graphs even though we prove it for FO[τM ]-sentences. One gets the
version for graphs using the machinery we developed in previous sections similarly as we do it to get
Corollary 7.5 from Proposition 7.4 below.
We write M : w 7→ ∞ for the universal Turing machine M and a word w ∈ {0, 1}∗ if M on
input w does not halt. We make use of the sentences ϕ0w, ϕ1M , and γM defined in the previous
section.
Proposition 7.3. There is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τE ]-sentence ϕ decides whether the
class GRAPH fin(ϕ) is closed under induced subgraphs.
Proof : For the universal Turing machineM and a word w ∈ {0, 1}∗ consider the sentence
πw := ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM .
Then
MOD fin(πw) is closed under induced subgraphs ⇐⇒ M : w 7→ ∞. (27)
In fact, if M : w 7→ ∞, then MOD fin(πw) = ∅, hence MOD fin(πw) is trivially closed under in-
duced subgraphs. If M on input w halts after h(w) steps, then, up to isomorphism, there is a unique
model Aw of πw and it has h(w) + 1 elements. By Lemma 3.8 every proper induced substructure
of Aw is not a model of πw. Hence MOD fin(πw) is not closed under induced subgraphs. As the
halting problem for every universal Turing machine is not decidable, by (27) we get our claim. ✷
Proposition 7.4. There is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τM ]-sentence, which is finitely equiv-
alent to a universal sentence, computes such a universal sentence.
Proof : Again we show that such an algorithm would allow us to decide for every w ∈ {0, 1}∗ whether
the universal Turing machineM halts on input w. In (19) we defined χw by
χw = ϕ0w ∧ (ϕ1M → ¬γM).
If M halts on w, by Lemma 6.3 we know that MOD(χw) is closed under <-substructures and thus
equivalent to a universal sentence. The claimed algorithm (or, even the Completeness Theorem) will
produce such a universal µ. Furthermore, by Corollary 6.2 we know that there is a finite model with
h(w) + 1 elements, which is a model of ϕ0w ∧ ¬χw, hence it is a model of ϕ0w ∧ ¬µ.
IfM does not halt onw, then we show that MOD fin(χw) = MOD fin(ϕ0w). Clearly MODfin(χw) ⊆
MODfin(ϕ0w). Now letA be a finite model of ϕ0w. IfA 6|= ϕ1M , thenA |= χw. OtherwiseA |= ϕ1M ,
thenA correctly represents the first |A|−1 steps of the computation ofM onw by Lemma 6.1. ThusA
is a model of ¬γM asM does not halt on w. Therefore, A is a model of χw.
Now we can see whether M does not halt on w by checking whether the universal sentence
produced by the claimed algorithm is finitely equivalent to the universal sentence ϕ0w . This can be
checked effectively by Corollary 2.5 and Corollary 2.6. ✷
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Corollary 7.5. There is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τE ]-sentence ϕ such that GRAPH fin(ϕ)
has a finite set of forbidden induced subgraphs computes such a set.
Proof : Equivalently we show that there is no algorithm that applied to any FO[τE ]-sentence ϕ such
that GRAPH fin(ϕ) = GRAPH fin(µ) for some universal sentence µ computes such a µ.
For graphs let I (= IτM ) be a strongly existential interpretation of τM -structures in graphs ac-
cording to Lemma 5.6. We know that for every finite τM -structure A there is a finite graph G such
that GI ∼= A.
For w ∈ {0, 1}∗ we consider the sentence ρw defined in (23) in the proof of Theorem 6.4,
ρw = ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ (ϕ0w ∧ (ϕ1M → ¬γM ))
I = ∀x¯¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ χ
I
w.
We show that ρw is equivalent to a universal sentence µ on finite graphs. Moreover, M does not halt
on input w if and only if µ is finitely equivalent to the universal sentence ∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w
If M halts on w, then ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM has no infinite model but a finite model A. Hence,
by Proposition 4.6 we know that GRAPH(ρw) is closed under induced subgraphs. Therefore, ρw
is equivalent to a universal sentence µ in GRAPH. Let G be a finite graph with GI ∼= A. Then
G |= (ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM )
I and thus, G |= ¬ρw. Hence G is a finite graph which is a model of
ϕI0w ∧ ¬µ. This means that µ is not equivalent to ∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w on all finite graphs, as G is also
a model of ∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w.
If M : w → ∞, then we show that GRAPH fin(ρw) = GRAPH fin(∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w). Clearly
GRAPHfin(ρw) ⊆ GRAPHfin(∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w). Now let the graph G be a model of ∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨
ϕI0w. Further we can assume that G |= ∃xϕuni(x¯). In particular, A := GI is well defined. If
G 6|= ϕI1M , then G |= χ
I
w and therefore, G |= ρw. If G |= ϕ
I
1M , then A |= ϕ0w ∧ ϕ
I
1M . As
M : w → ∞, by Lemma 6.1 the structure A correctly represents the first |A| − 1 steps of the
computation ofM on w. Thus, A is a model of ¬γM , again asM does not halt on input w. It follows
that G is a model of ¬γIM , and then G |= ρw.
Now we can decide the halting problem for M . Given a word w, we use the claimed algorithm
to get a universal sentence µ equivalent to ρw in the class of graphs. Finally we check whether µ is
finitely equivalent to ∀x¬ϕuni(x¯) ∨ ϕ
I
0w. This can be checked effectively again by Corollary 2.5 and
Corollary 2.6. ✷
Observe that Corollary 7.5 is precisely Theorem 1.3 as stated in the Introduction. Finally we prove
Theorem 1.2, which is equivalent to the following result.
Theorem 7.6. There is no algorithm that applied to an FO[τE]-sentence ϕ such that GRAPHfin(ϕ) is
closed under induced subgraphs decides whether there is a finite set F of graphs such that
GRAPHfin(ϕ) = FORBfin(F ).
Proof : Again we prove the corresponding result for τM -sentences and τM -structures and leave it to
the reader to translate it to graphs as in the previous proof. That is, we show:
There is no algorithm that applied to an FO[τM ]-sentence ϕ such that MODfin(ϕ) is
closed under induced substructures decides whether there is a finite set F of finite τM -
structures such that
MODfin(ϕ) = FORBfin(F ).
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For w ∈ {0, 1}∗ let
αw := ϕ0w ∧ (ϕ1M → γM ).
We show that MODfin(αw) is closed under induced subgraphs and that
M : w →∞ ⇐⇒ αw is not finitely equivalent to a universal sentence.
Assume first that M : w → ∞. Then ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM has no finite model by Lemma 6.1 and
the definition (18) of γM . Therefore, MODfin(αw) = MODfin(ϕ0w ∧ ¬ϕ1M ). By Lemma 3.10 we
know that MODfin(ϕ0w ∧ ¬ϕ1M ) is closed under induced substructures but not finitely equivalent to
a universal sentence.
Now assume that M on input w halts in h(w) steps. Then Corollary 6.2 guarantees that there is
a unique model Aw of ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM with |Aw| = h(w) + 1. We present a finite set F of finite
τM -structures such that
MODfin(αw) = FORBfin(F ). (28)
As ϕ0w is universal, there is a finite set F0 of finite τM -structures such that
MODfin(ϕ0w) = FORBfin(F0).
Moveover, we set
F1 :=
{
B ∈ STR[τM ]
∣∣ B |= ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M and B = [ℓ] for some ℓ ≤ h(w)}
and
F2 :=
{
B ∈ STR[τM ]
∣∣ B |= ϕ0w ∧ ϕ∗1M ∧ ∀t∀t′(t < t′ → ∀y¬Hqh(y, t))
and B = [h(w) + 2]
}
.
Here ϕ∗1M is obtained from ϕ1M by replacing the conjunct ϕ1
(
see (7)
)
by
ϕ∗1 := ∃xUminx ∧ ∀x∀y(x < y → ∃zSxz).
The difference is that ϕ∗1 does not require the set Umax to be nonempty. Hence,
ϕ∗1M = ϕ
∗
1 ∧ ∀x∀t
(
C0(x, t) ∨ C
comp
0 (x, t)
)
∧
∧
q∈Q
∀x∀t
(
Hq(x, t) ∨H
comp
q (x, t)
)
.
Note that Lemma 6.1 remains true if in its statement we replace ϕ1M by ϕ
∗
1M .
For F := F0 ∪F1 ∪F2 we show (28). Assume first that a finite structure C is a model of αw.
In particular, C |= ϕ0w and therefore, C has no induced substructure isomorphic to a structure in F0.
Now, for a contradiction suppose that B is an induced substructure of C isomorphic to a structure
in F1. Then B |= ϕ1M and thus, by Lemma 3.8, C = B. As C |= αw, we get C |= ϕ0w ∧ ϕ1M ∧ γM .
Hence, C ∼= Aw, a contradiction, as on the one hand |C| = |B| ≤ h(w) and on the other hand
|C| = |Aw| = h(w) + 1.
Next we show that C has no induced substructure B isomorphic to a structure in F2. As B |=
ϕ0w ∧ ϕ
∗
1M and has h(w) + 2 elements, the first h(w) + 1 elements of B correctly encode the first
h(w) steps of the computation of M on w, hence the full computation. As |B| = h(w) + 2, this
contradicts B |= ∀t∀t′
(
t < t′ → ∀y¬Hqh(y, t)
)
.
As the final step let C ∈ FORBfin(F ). We show that C |= αw. As C omits the structures in F0 as
induced substructures, we see that C |= ϕ0w. If C 6|= ϕ1M , we are done.
Recall that by Lemma 6.1 (more precisely, by the extension of Lemma 6.1 mentioned above) for
finite structures B of ϕ0w ∧ ϕ
∗
1M we know:
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(a) if |B| ≤ h(w) + 1, then B encodes |B| − 1 steps of the computation ofM on w,
(b) if |B| > h(w) + 1, then the first h(w) + 1 elements in the ordering <B correctly encode the
(full) computation ofM on w.
Now assume that C |= ϕ1M , then (a) and (b) apply to C. As no structure in F1 is isomorphic to
an induced substructure of C, we see that |C| ≥ h(w) + 1. But C cannot have more than h(w) +
1 elements, as otherwise the substructure of C induced on the first h(w) + 2 elements would be
isomorphic to a structure B in F2, a contradiction. ✷
Remark 7.7. Mainly using Remark 6.7 one easily verifies that in all results but Proposition 7.3 of this
section we can replace
There is no algorithm that applied to an FO[τE]-sentence ϕ . . .
by
There is no algorithm that applied to a Σ2-sentence ϕ . . .
In Proposition 7.3 we have to replace it by
There is no algorithm that applied to a Π2-sentence ϕ . . .
as ϕ1M (and ϕ
I
1M ) are Π2-sentences.
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